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Over the past two decades, researchers in the field of second language acquisition (SLA) have 
become increasingly interested in the concept of attention. The role of attention has significant 
implications for theories of second language input, processing, development, variation, and 
instruction. Most of the literature on attention also addresses the concept of awareness. The two 
concepts are inherently connected but can be operationally distinguished. This review focuses on 
attention and awareness with respect to their definitions, theories, and the empirical evidence of 
their role in learning. Emphasis will be on research from cognitive psychology. This is followed 
by a brief review of SLA research relevant to Schmidt’s Noticing Hypothesis (1990). The 
discussion suggests that: (a) Schmidt’s definition of attention, as detection among other things, 
disregards the possibility of learning without attention; (b) attention facilitates SLA; (c) 







Over the past two decades, researchers in the field of second language acquisition (SLA) have 
become increasingly interested in concepts traditionally associated with cognitive psychology 
such as memory, learnability, and connectionism. Ellis (2002) points out, “We are now at a stage 
at which there are important connections between SLA theory and the neuroscience of learning 
and memory” (p. 299). The concept of attention has become especially important because of its 
crucial role in so many aspects of SLA theory such as input, processing, development, variation, 
and instruction. Most of the literature on attention also addresses the concept of awareness. The 
two concepts are inherently connected but can be operationally distinguished. The following 
review will focus on attention and awareness with respect to their definitions, theories, and the 
empirical evidence of their role in learning. Emphasis will be on research from cognitive 
psychology. This is followed by a brief review of SLA research relevant to Schmidt’s Noticing 
Hypothesis (1990). 
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DEFINITIONS AND THEORY 
 
Attention and related terms such as consciousness, noticing, awareness, and 
understanding are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, making it difficult to 
compare theories and results from different studies (Schmidt, 1994a). This may be due to the 
inherent subjectivity in defining these concepts. In fact, in classical psychology, attention and 
consciousness are often viewed as two sides of the same coin. As Carr and Curran (1994) point 
out, “if you are conscious of something, then you are attending to it… and if you are attending to 
something, then you are conscious of it” (p. 219). Moreover, everyday use of the term conscious 
has a variety of overlapping meanings such as awake, aware, and deliberate. The reason for this 
overlap, as the following discussion will illustrate, is that these concepts are inherently 
connected, and one concept often entails the other. To clarify the distinctions between these 
terms, and for the purpose of consistency, this review will adopt definitions by Schmidt (1994a), 
which seem to be the most widely cited in SLA literature. 
Schmidt (1994a) identifies four dimensions to the concept of consciousness. The first is 
intention, which refers to a deliberateness on the part of the learner to attend to the stimulus. 
Intention is often associated with intentional versus incidental learning. Chomsky (1975), for 
example, argues that children’s acquisition of their first language is always incidental since 
children never really choose to learn their mother tongue. The second dimension of 
consciousness is attention, which basically refers to the detection of a stimulus. The third 
dimension is awareness, which refers to the learner’s knowledge or subjective experience that 
he/she is detecting a stimulus. Awareness is often associated with explicit versus implicit 
learning, since learners may or may not be aware that they have acquired a new structure (e.g., 
children generally seem unaware of the complex syntactic rules they acquire). The fourth 
dimension of consciousness is control, which refers to the extent to which the language learner’s 
output is controlled, requiring considerable mental processing effort, or spontaneous, requiring 
little mental processing effort. 
Turning to attention, Tomlin and Villa (1994) suggest there are four conceptions of 
attention in SLA. One is that of attention as a limited capacity system. The idea being that the 
brain may be presented (through the sensory system) with an overwhelming number of stimuli at 
any given time, and it seems impossible to process them all. The limitations of attention refer not 
only to the amount (or duration) of attention that may be given to a single stimulus but also to the 
number of stimuli that may be attended to simultaneously. This leads to a second conception of 
attention, namely that it constitutes a process of selection. The overwhelming amounts of 
incoming stimuli force the attentional system to be selective. The third conception of attention, 
already touched on under consciousness, is that it involves controlled rather than automatic 
processing of information. The underlying assumption here is that some tasks require more 
processing effort, and hence a higher degree of attention, than others. A person may therefore 
perform two tasks at the same time, especially if one requires automatic processing (low 
attention). By the same token, it is more difficult to perform two tasks if both require controlled 
processing (high attention). The fact that controlled processing of two simultaneous tasks is 
sometimes possible led researchers to develop a fourth conception of attention, which is that it 
must involve a process of coordination among competing stimuli and responses. In this process, 
attention must be established, maintained, discontinued, and redirected in order to perform 
different actions. 
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Posner and Petersen (1990) describe attention in terms of three networks: alertness, 
orientation, and detection. Alertness refers to a general state of readiness to receive input. The 
higher the level of alertness, the faster the speed of selecting information for processing will be. 
If selection is too quick, however, the quality of processing may suffer. Orientation refers to the 
alignment of attentional resources to a particular stimulus from among a host of stimuli. 
Orienting attention to a stimulus facilitates the processing of that stimulus. Posner, Walker, 
Friedrich, and Rafal (1987) propose that orientation is made up of three mechanisms: 
disengaging from a stimulus, shifting to a new one, and re-engaging with a new stimulus. 
Orientation differs from alertness in that a learner might for example be ready to learn (alertness) 
but not know whether to focus on form or meaning (orientation). Detection is probably the most 
important network in attention; it refers to the cognitive registration of a stimulus. Once a 
stimulus is detected, it becomes available for further processing. Although detection does not 
necessarily imply awareness, Schmidt (2001) suggests using the term registration to refer to 
stimuli that are detected without awareness. 
Awareness, as indicated, refers to an individual’s subjective experience of a stimulus or 
cognitive content. Allport (1988) suggests that three conditions must be met in order for a person 
to be aware of a given experience. First, the person must show a behavioral or cognitive change 
as a result of the experience. For example, a learner might begin using –ed endings as a result of 
having been exposed to input that targets the past tense. Second, the person must report that 
he/she was aware of the experience at the time it took place. For example, the learner might 
report having been aware of –ed endings in the verbs at the time of exposure. Finally, the person 
must be able to describe the experience. For example, the learner must be able to articulate the 
morphological rule underlying the regular past tense. Leow (2000) adopts a less strict definition 
of awareness that requires only the first two conditions to be met. He calls this low awareness. 
High awareness is achieved when all three conditions are met. 
To understand the role of awareness in learning, it is necessary to distinguish between 
learning and knowledge. Reber (1989) points out that these concepts have been confused even by 
experts. He defines implicit learning as “the process by which knowledge about the rule-
governed complexities of the stimulus environment is acquired independently of conscious 
attempts to do so” (p. 219). This contrasts with explicit learning, where the learner is aware of, 
and actively involved in, processing the input. Learning (a process) is then distinguished from 
knowledge (a product). Paradis (1994) identifies two types of knowledge. One is implicit 
knowledge, which is acquired without awareness, unavailable to conscious memory (even after 
acquisition), and put to use spontaneously without conscious control (e.g., linguistic 
competence). The second type is explicit knowledge, which is knowledge that the learner is 
aware of and can access on demand (e.g., metalinguistic knowledge of grammar). Some argue 
that no interaction between the two forms of knowledge is possible (Krashen, 1982; Paradis, 
1994; Truscott, 1998). Others argue that such interaction is possible at the level of learning, 
which implies a crucial role for noticing (Carr & Curran, 1994; Ellis, 1994; Schmidt 2001; 
Robinson, 1995). In any case, it is important to distinguish these concepts, because assuming for 
example that awareness is necessary for learning should not necessarily suggest that such explicit 
learning is going to result in explicit knowledge (even though the two are commonly associated 
with each other). 
So how does noticing fit into all of this? According to Schmidt (1994b) noticing refers to 
the “registration [detection] of the occurrence of a stimulus event in conscious awareness and 
subsequent storage in long term memory…” (p. 179). In terms of the dimensions discussed 
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earlier, we might represent Schmidt’s definition as follows: noticing = detection + awareness. 
However, since it is impossible to be aware of something without detecting it, we might as well 
simplify the equation to noticing = awareness (according to Schmidt). Schmidt is careful to 
distinguish noticing from understanding, which he defines as “recognition of a general principle, 
rule or pattern” (1995, p. 29). Understanding represents a deeper level of awareness than noticing 
which is limited to “elements of the surface structure of utterances in the input” rather than 
underlying rules (Schmidt, 2001, p. 5). The above definitions of consciousness, attention, and 
awareness are summarized in Figure 1 (for an alternative illustration showing the entailments of 
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Robinson (1995) discusses two categories of attentional theories in cognitive psychology, 
both of which incorporate memory, an aspect he believes has been ignored in SLA literature. The 
first category, filter theories, addresses the notion of selection in attention (i.e., which of the 
incoming stimuli will be selected for further processing). The assumption in all filter theories is 
that there is only one channel of attention. Accordingly, simultaneous performance of two tasks 
can only be achieved through rapid alteration of attention between them. One such theory is the 
“bottleneck” model (Broadbent, 1958, as cited in Robinson, 1995) where input is: (a) registered 
by the senses, (b) selected (filtered), (c) detected, and (d) entered into short-term memory. This 
early selection model assumes that only form can be noticed at the selection stage, and that 
meaning is analyzed once the input has passed the filter. Other early selection models propose 
that both form and meaning are analyzed before detection, but this would involve substantial 
mental processing of the input before noticing even takes place. Finally, there are filter models 
that propose that selection does not take place until the input has entered short-term memory 
(late selection). In this view, selected input is rehearsed and unselected input is forgotten. 
1. Intention 3. Control 
Alertness 






4. Awareness 2. Attention 
Consciousness 
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Rehearsal can involve data-driven processing, which refers to maintaining instances of the input 
in memory, or conceptually-driven processing, which refers to the activation of schemata from 




Early and Late Selection/Filter Models of Attention Adapted from Best (1992) cited 

















The second category of attention theories are capacity theories, which differ from filter 
theories in that they do not assume that the stimuli are necessarily competing for attentional 
resources. Instead of describing attention as a filter, the metaphor here is that of a spotlight, 
which can be narrowed (focal attention) and broadened (global attention). Key factors in capacity 
theories are the voluntariness of attention and the attentional demands of the task itself. Wickens 
(1980) proposes that attentional resources are best viewed as multiple pools that lie along three 
intersecting dimensions: (a) cognitive activities versus response processes, (b) processing codes 
of spatial versus linguistic activities, and (c) processing modalities (auditory versus visual 
perception and vocal versus manual responses). He argues that attentional demands become 
more difficult when simultaneous tasks are drawing on the same attentional pools such as, for 
example, trying to hold two conversations at the same time. In such cases serial processing is 
necessary as the focus of attention shifts between the two tasks. In other cases, where the 
attentional demands differ, parallel processing is possible, but the quality of performance may 
suffer as a result. For example, most people can drive while talking on their cell phones, but 
many countries outlaw that practice because it seems to distract focal attention from driving. 
Wickens points out that individuals may differ with respect to memory and parallel processing 
ability, suggesting that such variables need to be accounted for in attentional studies. 
Most theories assume that attention plays a positive role in processing input because it 
involves detection and selection. However, attention may also be viewed as an inhibiting 
mechanism that prevents items from being processed. According to Schmidt (2001), “research on 
inhibitory processes is probably the most active and theoretically interesting work within 
attention theory at the present time” (p. 22). Absence of the inhibitory mechanisms of attention is 
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best illustrated in attention deficit disorders, which prevent individuals from focusing their 
attention on a given stimulus. In such cases, individuals are unable to resist or inhibit potentially 




EVIDENCE FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
 
The Nature of Attention 
 
Before discussing studies that address the role of attention in learning, I will briefly 
review some research that informs about the nature of attention itself. This will provide a better 
understanding of some of the attentional theories and definitions mentioned in the previous 
section, specifically, attention as a limited capacity system, late selection models, the three 
networks of attention (alertness, orientation, and detection), and attention as an inhibitory 
mechanism. 
The notion that attention is a limited capacity system was demonstrated by Sperling 
(1960). Five participants were presented with nine letters arranged in three rows for 50 
milliseconds (ms) per trial. When asked to recall all letters, participants’ average recollection 
was 4-5 letters. In order to rule out the possibility that incomplete recollection was due to visual 
limitations, participants were directed to recall a particular (upper, medium, or lower) row after 
the letters were removed from the display. This procedure led to almost perfect recollection of 
each row. These findings suggest that attention is limited in terms of orientation rather than 
detection. That is, despite having detected (seen) all nine letters, attention could only be oriented 
to a limited part of the input (one row). This also suggests that selection takes place after 
detection in accordance with late selection models (see Figure 2). 
Neuroanatomical evidence seems to support the description of attention as three distinct 
but interrelated networks (Posner & Petersen, 1990). Monitoring electrical activity and blood 
flow in the brain using event related potentials and positron emission tomography has enabled 
researchers to relate attentional networks to certain regions of the brain. Accordingly, alertness, 
orientation, and detection were found to be associated with increased activity in separate but 
anatomically connected areas of the brain (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner & Rothbart, 1992). 
The notion of attention as an inhibitory mechanism has been demonstrated in negative 
priming studies. In such studies, a participant is simultaneously presented with two stimuli. The 
participant is asked to respond (attend) to one stimulus while ignoring the other for a number of 
consecutive trials. If that participant is then asked to respond to the previously ignored stimulus 
on a subsequent trial, his/her response time is often slower than it was to the previously attended 
stimulus, which is not surprising because the participant may have developed practice effects 
with the original stimulus. What is surprising is that the response time of the same participant to 
a completely new stimulus is often faster than it is to the previously ignored stimulus. This 
phenomenon, a delayed reaction time to previously ignored stimuli, is referred to as negative 
priming and it seems to reflect an inhibitory mechanism of attention that tags stimuli as 
irrelevant for subsequent processing, making it more difficult (time consuming) to attend to such 
stimuli when asked to do so. 
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In a series of experiments, DeSchepper and Treisman (1996) showed that negative 
priming can occur with novel shapes as stimuli. In one experiment, participants (n=10) were 
presented with a pair of overlapping shapes that were colored red and green next to another 
shape that was colored white. They were asked to ignore the red shape and decide as quickly as 
possible if the green shape matched the white one. Response was given by pushing one of two 
buttons labeled “same” and “different”. Shapes were presented such that the ignored red shape 
(negative prime) would reappear on a subsequent trial as a target shape in green. Results showed 
that response time was slower to negatively primed shapes, suggesting that an inhibitive effect 
was present. In another experiment with different groups (n=20, 24, 30, 32), DeSchepper and 
Treisman found that negative priming effects lasted up to a month after exposure. However, not 
all participants showed evidence of such effects. 
The above studies are some of the few that provide insight into the nature of attention. 
They also provide evidence to support some of the aforementioned theories that attempt to define 
attention as being a limited resource as well as a faculty that can function below the level of 
consciousness (i.e., without awareness).  
 
 
Attention and Learning 
 
Early experiments investigating the role of attention in learning tended to be selective 
attention studies, which require participants to attend to one stimulus while ignoring another. 
These studies typically use dichotic listening tasks, in which participants wear headphones that 
present them with a different aural stimulus in each ear. Tasks are designed to heighten attention 
to one ear while depleting it in the other. After exposure, an assessment is made as to how much 
of the unattended stimulus was detected. For example, Moray (1959) asked 12 participants to 
shadow2 prose passages that were presented in one ear while listening to 35 repetitions of seven 
words in the other ear. Results showed that the suppressed stimulus was not noticed as 
participants were unable to recall any of the seven words. Another dichotic listening study with 
two participants by Norman (1969) also found that recollection of the unattended words was very 
poor. However, some recollection was possible when the time between exposure and testing was 
very short, suggesting that attention may not be necessary for cognitive registration in short-term 
memory. Using a slightly different experimental design, Allport, Antonis, and Reynolds (1972) 
found that performance on divided attention tasks was dependent on the nature of both tasks. In 
one experiment 6 participants were asked to shadow a passage under one of three conditions: (1) 
listening to words in the other ear; (2) viewing words; (3) viewing pictures. Visual stimuli were 
displayed on a projector screen. Results showed that recognition of the unattended stimulus was 
poor in all three settings. However, there were statistically significant differences between each 
condition. Condition (1) was most affected by divided attention, followed by condition (2), and 
condition (3). This suggests that divided attention was most difficult when the two tasks shared 
the same modality such as the aural tasks in condition (1). In another experiment, five music 
students were asked to sight-read and perform piano music while shadowing an aural passage as 
a distraction. This time, the distracting stimulus seemed to have little or no effect on the 
performance of the primary task. These findings seem to confirm Wickens’ (1980) model of 
                                                 
2 Shadowing refers to repeating the prose out loud while listening 
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attention as multiple pools, which proposes that divided attention is best coordinated under 
contrasting task demands and modalities.  
One drawback of dichotic listening studies is that they cannot rule out the possibility that 
participants paid some attention to the suppressed stimulus. Even when instructed to ignore one 
stimulus and shadow the other, participants may momentarily switch attention (Schmidt, 1995). 
Another drawback is that these studies often rely on introspective measures (recall and 
recognition), which may not be reliable considering that a participant may attend to something 
but fail to remember it on the posttest. This is illustrated in a more innovative dichotic listening 
study by Eich (1984). Sixteen participants shadowed a passage that was presented in one ear and 
word pairs were simultaneously presented in the other. The second word in each pair was a 
homophone (e.g., fair and fare); the first word was strongly associated with the less common 
interpretation of the homophone (e.g., Taxi- Fare). Following exposure, a recognition test (an 
introspective measure) was used to assess retention of the suppressed stimulus. As in previous 
studies, recognition of the suppressed stimulus was poor. However, a subsequent spelling test on 
homophones (a performance measure) revealed that participants were more likely to produce the 
less common interpretation with homophones to which they had been exposed than homophones 
to which they had not. In other words, the performance measure seems to have tapped into 
attended but forgotten (or unnoticed) knowledge, which the introspective measure failed to catch. 
Accordingly, performance measures (also called objective measures) have been more common in 
recent cognitive research. 
Recent research has also relied more on divided attention studies, in which participants 
are asked to perform two tasks simultaneously. One of the tasks usually requires concentrated 
attention, making it extremely difficult to attend to the other task. The point of this measure is to 
ensure that attention is not oriented to the suppressed stimulus. The attended stimulus is often a 
Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task, an experimental design pioneered by Nissen and Bullemer 
(1987). The four experiments in their study are widely cited as evidence that attention is 
necessary for learning. Moreover, a number of subsequent studies have adopted their 
methodology such as Cohen, Ivry, and Keele (1990) and Curran and Keele (1993) (see below).  
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) presented participants with a light that appeared in one of 
four possible locations on a computer monitor. The task was to press a keyboard button 
corresponding to each light as soon as it appeared. Reaction time was recorded by a computer. 
Each participant was presented with eight blocks of 100 trials. Each trial consisted of 10 light 
sequences appearing either randomly (random condition) or in a certain order (repeating 
condition). Participants were unaware of the sequencing, which made them perceive each block 
as a continuous series of 100 trials. There were 12 participants in all groups. In the first 
experiment, the repeating group and the random group conducted only the SRT task. Participants 
in the random group were chosen such that their mean SRT was equivalent to those in the 
repeating group. Results showed that the random group improved their SRT by 32 ms, which 
was attributed to practice. The repeating group showed a more significant improvement of 164 
ms, which suggests that they had learned the sequence and were able to predict where the next 
light would appear. The second experiment included three new groups. Two groups were 
presented with an SRT task with a repeating sequence as before. But for one group, the computer 
generated either a high or low tone after each light, and participants were asked to report the 
number of low tones they had heard at the end of each block. The third group was presented with 
the same dual task except that the sequence was random. Another difference is that all three 
groups were tested on predicting where the next light would appear after the fourth block, which 
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would provide evidence of more explicit learning. Measures of both response time and prediction 
did not show evidence of learning in the repeating dual-task group, whose performance was 
inferior to the repeating single-task group. Moreover the difference in response time between the 
repeating and random dual-task groups was not significant. In other words, dividing attention 
seemed to have a significant negative effect on performance, suggesting that attention was 
necessary for learning. The third experiment compared the performance of the repeating dual-
task group on a subsequent repeating single-task with the performance of a group that had no 
previous experience. Interestingly, the more experienced group did not outperform the novices, 
confirming that they had not learned anything from their previous experience under divided 
attention conditions. (Nissen and Bullemer’s fourth experiment will be discussed in the next 
section on awareness.) 
Different results were found in a similar SRT study by Cohen et al. (1990). Their 
methodology was a variant of Nissen and Bullemer’s (1987) dual versus single task and random 
versus repeating sequence paradigm. One of the questions the researchers wanted to address was 
whether the nature of the sequence affected learning in a dual task. This was achieved by 
presenting experimental groups with three types of sequences (n= 12 in all groups). One 
sequence contained five items, none of which were repeated in a sequence. That is, each item 
had a unique association with the following item within a sequence. By assigning numbers to 
represent the position of the lights from left to right we can represent this type of sequence as 
follows: 1 5 2 4 3. The second type of structure contained six items, each one of which occurred 
twice (e.g., 1 3 2 3 1 2). In this structure no unique association existed between two adjacent 
items, making it impossible to use pairwise linear association to learn the structure. The third 
type of structure was a hybrid version of the first two, containing two unique associations and 
two ambiguous associations. In contrast to the original study, Cohen et al. found that structured 
sequence learning was possible in dual tasks as long as the structure type was linear (types 1 and 
3). Hierarchical structures (type 2), however, could not be learned when attention was divided. 
This may have significant implications for language learning since most current theories of 
syntax subscribe to a hierarchical structure of constituents (Radford, 1997). Another question 
addressed in this study was whether increasing distracter difficulty affects learning of structured 
sequences. This was achieved by varying the number of low tones to be counted in different 
experimental groups. Results showed that increasing the attentional demands of the distracting 
stimulus did not have a significant effect on performance, suggesting that learning linear 
structured sequences may require only residual attention. However, Cohen et al. admit that 
different results may have been obtained if the dual tasks were sharing the same modality (i.e., 
tapping into the same attentional pools). 
Another variant of Nissen and Bullemer’s (1987) SRT study was conducted by Curran 
and Keele (1993). Although the study’s focus was on transfer effects between declarative and 
procedural knowledge, their results have frequently been interpreted as evidence for learning 
without attention. In one experiment, one group was provided with an explanation of the 
sequence that the lights would follow (intentional group) and the other group was not (incidental 
group) (n=15 in each group). Both groups underwent single and dual task trials to assess whether 
what had been learned under single-task conditions would transfer to dual-task conditions. As 
might be expected, the intentional group outperformed the incidental group on the single task, 
but the two groups showed the same limited amount of learning under dual task conditions. This 
seems to confirm Cohen et al.’s findings that non-attentional learning is possible. It also suggests 
that the type of knowledge acquired under non-attentional conditions (procedural knowledge) 
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differs from the type of knowledge acquired when attention is paid (declarative knowledge), 
since participants appeared unable to utilize their declarative knowledge in non-attentional 
contexts. 
Based on an experimental paradigm developed by Reber (1967), Whittlesea and Dorken 
(1993) assessed learning of miniature artificial grammars (MAGs)3 under three attentional 
conditions. In condition one, participants (n=26) were misled to believe that the purpose of the 
experiment was to test their short-term memory of three-digit numbers. Between the 
presentations of numbers, participants were asked to repeat letter strings out loud as a distraction 
task. In condition two, the letter strings were the only task, and participants had to determine 
whether a particular letter had been repeated in other parts of the string. In condition three 
participants were asked to memorize the letter strings. Following all conditions, participants had 
to provide grammaticality judgments of strings using the same letters or different letters. Results 
showed above-chance judgments for all groups when the original letters were used. However, 
when different letters were used, and knowledge of the MAG was necessary to give the correct 
response, results showed no evidence of learning under condition one (dual task). This would 
suggest that attention is necessary for learning even linear structures. The contradiction between 
these findings and those of Cohen et al. (1990) and Curran and Keele (1993) may be due to 
differences in the modality of the input (lights versus letter strings). 
Modality differences between the attended and the unattended tasks seem to be a general 
problem with divided attention studies. If attention is perceived using the aforementioned 
analogy of a spotlight that can be focused and broadened, then we must consider the possibility 
that the unattended stimulus may have been partially attended, especially when the two stimuli 
are of different modalities and draw on different attentional pools. An attempt was made to 
address this issue in a divided attention study by Kellogg (1980). The study used mental 
multiplication as the attended stimulus and face recognition as the unattended stimulus. 
Participants (n=156) were asked to: (a) look at the center of a slide projector screen showing a 
face with each slide, (b) visualize two numbers being read to them with each slide, (c) mentally 
multiply the two numbers, and (d) write down their answer. Participants were told that the more 
they visualized the multiplication problems, the more accurate their calculations would be. 
Kellogg hoped that such visualizations would control for the difference in modalities problem by 
forcing visual attention to the numbers and away from the faces. A surprise recognition test was 
administered five minutes after the exposure. Participants showed better than chance recognition 
of the faces presented, suggesting that attention was not necessary for long-term memory. 
The studies reviewed so far seem to provide conflicting evidence as to the necessity of 
attention in learning. This may be due to the methodological difficulty of demonstrating a 
complete absence of attention. According to Schmidt (1995), studies claiming to show evidence 
of learning without attention are only showing that less attention leads to less learning. He argues 
that the participants in Kellogg’s study could easily have ignored the instructions and 
momentarily attended to the faces presented. Since there was no way of verifying that 
participants followed instructions, it seems quite possible that some attention may have been paid 
to the suppressed stimulus. Schmidt also suggests an explanation for the conflicting evidence in 
the SRT studies. He points out that the light sequences used in Nissen and Bullemer’s (1987) 
study had longer patterns (10 positions) and were of a more complex nature since some of the 
                                                 
3 MAGs consist of strings of letters (e.g. ELFENAD, OLFAPID) generated by an underlying system of linear rules 
or grammar. 
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elements could be followed by more than one subsequent element (e.g., position 2 could be 
followed by either positions 4 or 3). In Curran and Keele (1993), the light sequences followed 
shorter patterns (6 positions) and each element could only be followed by one subsequent 
element (e.g., 2 can only be followed by 4; 1 can only be followed by 3). Assuming more 
complex stimuli require more attention, it would make sense that participants were unable to 
learn Nissen and Bullemer’s complex patterns with divided attention but were able to do so with 
Curran and Keele’s simpler patterns. This seems to be confirmed by Cohen et al.’s (1990) 
findings that only simpler linear structures could be learned without attention. 
But does this mean that some learning without attention is possible? Even Curran and 
Keele (1993) admit that “When we refer to one form of leaning as nonattentional, we do not wish 
to imply that no attention whatsoever is used on the primary task. Undoubtedly, subjects must in 
some sense attend to a visual stimulus to make a response” (p. 190). The concept of 
nonattentional learning is both methodologically and theoretically problematical. 
Methodologically, it seems difficult if not impossible to demonstrate a complete absence of 
attention when learning takes place (Schmidt, 1995). Very often it seems to be awareness rather 
than attention that is absent in such cases. Since learning necessarily requires detection, and since 
detection is the essence of attention, learning without attention is also theoretically impossible 
(Truscott, 1998).  
 
 
Awareness and Learning 
 
As mentioned, awareness refers to the learner’s knowledge or subjective experience that 
he/she is detecting a stimulus; implicit learning is learning that takes place without awareness. 
Before addressing the issue of implicit learning, we will briefly touch on the more basic issue of 
implicit perception. Is it possible to perceive something without being aware of it? This question 
is addressed in a widely cited study by Marcel (1983), which used semantic priming as a 
measure for perception. Semantic priming refers to a person’s tendency to respond quicker to a 
target word (e.g., student) when it is preceded or primed by a semantically related word (e.g., 
teacher) than when it is preceded by a semantically unrelated word (e.g., yogurt). Marcel 
exploited this tendency using primes that were presented (masked) below an objectively defined 
threshold of awareness. Individual thresholds were previously established by testing different 
degrees of masking and asking participants if they were aware of the presence of a word 
(masking refers to obscuring the target word with different letters). Participants (n=12) were 
primed by asking them to focus on the masked words for a certain amount of time. Next they 
were asked to read aloud as quickly as possible words presented to them on a screen. Priming 
effects were measured by response time to the target word. Results showed evidence of semantic 
priming even when the prime word was masked below the threshold of awareness. This led 
Marcel to conclude that perception without awareness was possible. Note that these findings 
cannot be interpreted as perception without attention since participants were clearly attending to 
the screen.  
Using a variant of the SRT methodology, Hartman, Knopman, and Nissen (1989) found 
further evidence of learning without awareness. Instead of responding to a pattern of lights, 
participants were presented with a series of words on a computer monitor. In the first 
experiment, participants were instructed to repeat each word aloud as quickly as possible when it 
appeared. Reaction time was measured from the appearance of the word on the screen to the 
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onset of a verbal response from the participant. The experimental group (n=15) was presented 
with a 10-word repeating sequence of four words as follows: MUSIC, RULER, LADY, OCEAN, 
LADY, RULER, MUSIC, LADY, RULER, OCEAN. The control group (n=15) was presented 
with the same four words in a random fashion. Neither group was informed about any order in 
the words. After the task, participants were asked if they had noticed a pattern, and if so, to 
describe it. Participants unable to identify more than three consecutive words from the list were 
classified as “unaware”. In the second experiment, participants were presented with a different 
set of words: MAPLE, HAMMER, SALMON, ROBIN, SALMON, HAMMER, MAPLE, 
SALMON, HAMMER, ROBIN. Instead of repeating each word, participants were instructed to 
say the semantic category to which each word belonged (i.e., ROBIN: BIRD, HAMMER: 
TOOL, SALMON: FISH, and MAPLE: TREE). The results in both experiments suggest that 
better performance (faster reaction time) was associated with awareness of the repeating word 
pattern. However, even unaware participants showed significant learning when asked to respond 
with the semantic category in the second experiment. Schmidt (1995) takes issue with the 
researchers’ classification of unaware learners in this study. He claims that it is “hard to 
understand” why Hartman et al. chose to classify participants who could not report more than 
three consecutive words as being unaware (p. 22). However, Hartman et al.’s measure of 
awareness was not haphazard, as Schmidt seems to suggest, but based on empirical evidence 
from Willingham, Nissen, and Bullemer (1989, as cited in Hartman et al., 1989), which shows 
that objective performance measures of awareness (e.g., guessing what the next word will be) of 
participants reporting less than four items in a 10-item sequence consistently matched those 
reporting no awareness at all. Hartman et al. acknowledge that participants classified as unaware 
“may have had some sense that a pattern was present, [but] they were unable to make use of that 
knowledge consciously” (p. 1072). Nevertheless, Schmidt’s objection to the term unaware is 
well taken because a participant’s ability to report three consecutive words from the list may in 
fact constitute some awareness (rather than none). Accordingly, future research might consider 
using classifications such as less aware rather than unaware. 
Most of the abovementioned attentional studies also tried to assess the effects of 
awareness as being distinct from attention. Following SRT trials, Nissen and Bullemer (1987) 
questioned participants as to whether they had noticed a sequence, and if so, to report when they 
had noticed it. Nine out of 12 participants in the single-task repeating group reported an 
awareness of the sequence, and 11 out of 12 in the dual-task repeating group did not report any 
such awareness. Since the performance of the single-task group was superior to that of the dual-
task group, Schmidt (1995) cites these awareness reports as evidence that “there was a very 
strong relationship between awareness and learning in these experiments” [his emphasis] (p. 21). 
However, this conclusion overlooks an important detail. As Nissen and Bullemer point out, “The 
response times of most normal subjects showed evidence of some learning well before they 
reported that they noticed the sequence” (p. 29). This suggests that learning was in fact possible 
without awareness because learning seems to have preceded awareness. 
Similar results were found by Cohen et al. (1990). Following the primary SRT task, 
participants performed another task requiring them to predict where the next light would appear 
by pressing certain buttons (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Unlike the SRT task, which requires 
implicit knowledge, the prediction task requires participants to use explicit knowledge. By 
comparing performance at the end of the SRT task with performance at the beginning phase of 
the prediction task, it was possible to infer how much explicit knowledge had already been 
available and thereby assess awareness. This method has two advantages over questionnaires and 
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verbal reports. One is that it does not lead the participant into awareness. The second advantage 
is that it avoids potential guessing and forgetting. Results showed that some participants who had 
mastered the sequence implicitly were able to predict the positions of the next light, but others 
were unable to do so despite showing evidence of implicit learning. This led the researchers to 
conclude that awareness may not be necessary for memory and learning. 
Nissen and Bullemer’s (1987) fourth experiment is believed to provide even stronger 
evidence of the dissociation of awareness and learning. The same SRT procedures were 
conducted with 6 participants suffering from anterograde amnesia resulting from Korsakoff’s 
syndrome (a condition that severely inhibits access to explicit or conscious memory). They found 
that participants were able to learn the structured sequences. Since Korsakoff patients have no 
access to declarative memory, their performance is often explained as learning without 
awareness. Carr and Curran (1994) have gone as far as claiming that structural learning by 
amnesics is “the gold standard of implicit learning” (p. 216). Schmidt (1995), however, claims 
that learning by anterograde amnesics is actually unreliable evidence of implicit learning. He 
points out that normal persons are able to report their level of awareness some time after the 
exposure, but amnesics cannot provide such reports due to their condition, which makes it 
impossible to assess their awareness in the first place. That is, according to Schmidt, the inability 
to recall the state of awareness at the time of exposure does not necessarily entail that the person 
was unaware at that time. However, even if the amnesic was aware at the time of exposure, we 
might consider that his/her awareness differs in one form or another from the type of awareness 
that enters long-term memory in normal persons. A normal person may be aware, forget, and 
then remember again because his/her awareness is linked to explicit long-term memory with 
lasting effects that may be realized at a later time. The amnesic’s awareness, on the other hand, is 
fleeting and may only have immediate effects that cannot be remembered or revisited at a later 
time. It must be linked to implicit memory if it is to have any long-term effect at all. In any case, 
the question of whether forgotten awareness can affect learning is one that needs further 
investigation. 
Awareness was also assessed in Curran and Keele’s (1993) SRT study. One group of 
participants (n=14) was explicitly informed about the pattern of the lights before the trial. 
Another group (n=30) was administered an awareness questionnaire that asked them if they 
thought the lights appeared at random locations or according to some pattern. Those who thought 
there was a pattern were asked to describe it. Participants were then classified as more aware if 
they were able to correctly identify four of the six sequence positions, and less aware if they 
could identify three or fewer. Results showed that participants who were explicitly informed did 
better than the more aware group (n=19), who in turn did better than the less aware group 
(n=11), which suggests that awareness may play a facilitative role in learning. 
The discussion so far has addressed studies from cognitive psychology with regard to 
attention and awareness in learning. Can such findings be generalized to SLA? Is learning, as it 
was operationalized in the above studies, analogous to the processes of language acquisition? 
Clearly, there are major differences between the input in these experiments and natural language. 
Syntactic structures are far more complex and ambiguous than ordered sequences and MAGs, 
which have no meaning or morphology.4 There are also differences in the learning process itself. 
                                                 
4 Schmidt (1994b) points out that there has been some psycholinguistic research using artificial languages, which 
have constituent structure and meaning, but this research has not addressed the issues of attention or awareness in 
learning.  
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SLA is largely an interactive process that involves the negotiation of meaning between 
interlocutors (Long, 1996). The type of learning demonstrated in the cognitive studies, by 
contrast, involved almost no feedback. Finally, differences in the findings between SRT and 
MAG studies suggest that differences in modality probably play a role in attentional demands. It 
follows that SLA might involve attentional demands that differ significantly from the stimuli 
used in cognitive studies. Nevertheless, structured sequences (especially MAGs) may provide a 
rough analogue of natural language because they reflect a complex underlying system of rules 
(Schmidt, 1994b). The investigation of how such rules are acquired with and without 
attention/awareness has provided insights into general cognitive processes that may be related to 
language acquisition but would have been difficult to capture using natural language as input. 
For example, differences between random and repeating or linear and hierarchical structures as 




THE NOTICING HYPOTHESIS AND SLA 
 
Much of Schmidt’s work ties findings from cognitive psychology into SLA theory. As N. 
Ellis points out, “Schmidt is one of the few linguists who have adopted the conceptual and 
experimental rigours of experimental psychology in answering questions concerning the role of 
consciousness in L2 acquisition” (1994, p. 10). Reviewing the psychological literature on 
consciousness has led Schmidt to propose the Noticing Hypothesis, which states that “noticing is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for converting input into intake” (1990, p. 129)5. Since 
then, a considerable amount of research has addressed the issue of noticing in SLA. This section 
will briefly review some of that research. The discussion will mostly be limited to research 
designs that include some measure of noticing. 
The noticing hypothesis seems to have been motivated by a seminal study by Schmidt 
and Frota (1986), which documents the role of noticing for a beginner learning Portuguese in 
Portugal over a period of 22 weeks. Extensive diary entries by the learner (Schmidt) were 
compared to tape-recorded interactions with native speakers to compare what had been noticed 
with what had been learned. Their findings question the assumption that language acquisition is a 
purely subconscious process (Krashen, 1982), since the learner clearly noticed some of the 
grammatical structures he seemed to have acquired. Different results were obtained in a similar 
study by Altman (1990, as cited in Schmidt, 1990), who monitored her own acquisition of 
Hebrew over a period of five years. She recorded her data in diaries, class notes, and underlined 
words in readings. These were compared to taped production tasks to see whether newly 
acquired vocabulary reflected what she had noticed in class as well as in naturalistic settings. 
Altman was unable to identify the source of half of the new verbs she had learned. She 
concluded that awareness was not necessary in learning vocabulary. Schmidt and Frota also 
admit that they were unable to trace much of what had been acquired to what had been noticed. 
Self reports are inherently subjective. Moreover, memory effects may play a role depending on 
the amount of time that passes before the diary entry is made. Nevertheless, first person accounts 
                                                 
5 Intake refers to “a process that mediates between target language input and the learner’s internalized set of rules” 
(Gass, 1988, p. 206). Intake may or may not lead to acquisition depending on how the input affects the learner’s 
interlanguage. 
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seem to be the most valid method for assessing what is noticed. Other methods, such as posttests 
of target structures, allow only for inferences regarding the awareness of learners. Another 
source of validity in these studies is that they were longitudinal and included genuine 
communicative settings in and outside the classroom, which is quite rare in attentional studies. 
One of the most influential attentional studies in SLA was conducted by VanPatten 
(1990), who investigated the notion of attention as a limited resource (Broadbent, 1958, as cited 
in Robinson, 1995; Wickens, 1980). More specifically, the study examined whether learners 
were able to consciously attend to both form and meaning when processing input6. Two hundred 
and two participants in university Spanish classes (levels I-III) were divided into four groups. All 
groups were presented with an audio recording of a 3-minute text and asked to listen for content. 
The control group did nothing else (content only). The other groups performed one of three 
additional tasks: (1) listening for the content word inflación (lexical); (2) listening for the definite 
article la (form); and (3) listening for the verb morpheme -n (morphology). Performance was 
assessed using a free written recall in English. Results showed that the content only and lexical 
groups significantly outperformed the form and morphology groups. This led VanPatten to 
conclude that it was difficult, especially for beginners, to notice content and form at the same 
time. Moreover, he postulated that learners would notice meaning before form, since their 
primary objective is to understand the propositional content of utterances. 
VanPatten’s findings have led SLA researchers to try and find ways to help learners focus 
on both form and meaning. One such way is input enhancement, which refers to the 
manipulation of certain aspects of the input (e.g., form) to make them more salient and thereby 
more noticeable to learners (Sharwood Smith, 1993). Typographical input enhancement usually 
entails italicizing, using boldface, or underlining in order to highlight the target structure. Alanen 
(1995) examined the role of typographical input enhancement and explicit rule representation on 
the acquisition of locative suffixes and consonant alternation in semi-artificial Finish. The input 
consisted of two passages with a picture and a Finish-English glossary of relevant words and 
forms. Participants were 36 university-level students with no prior knowledge of Finish. These 
were divided into a control group and three treatment groups according to different types of 
input, as follows: (1) italicizing the target structure (enhanced); (2) explicit rule presentation 
(rule); and (3) italicizing and explicit rule presentation (rule + enhanced). Performance was 
assessed with a pretest and a posttest, and think-aloud protocols were provided by participants as 
they read the passage. In terms of their performance on these tests, it was hypothesized that the 
treatment groups would fall into the following order: control < enhanced < rule < rule + 
enhanced. This pattern was only partially realized in the results as the quantitative analysis 
showed no significant difference between the enhanced and unenhanced input groups. However, 
think-aloud protocols revealed that learners who noticed the target forms learned more than those 
who did not. 
A quasi-experimental study by White (1998) investigated the effects of typographical 
input enhancement and explicit instruction on sixth grade ESL students in a French elementary 
school. The study compared the performance of three treatment groups: (1) input enhancement + 
explicit instruction (n=27); (2) input enhancement (n=30); and (3) unenhanced input (n=29). The 
target structure was possessive determiners. Learning was assessed using an immediate and a 
delayed posttest after 5 weeks. In terms of performance, it was hypothesized that treatment 
groups would fall into the following order: group (1) > group (2) > group (3). Although the 
                                                 
6 VanPatten’s use of the term conscious attention seems to refer to attention + awareness (noticing). 
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accuracy ratio seemed to confirm this hypothesis, within-group variance cancelled out the 
expected between-group differences, suggesting that noticing did not have a significant effect. 
However, without introspective measures, there was no way of verifying if and what learners had 
actually noticed.  
Stronger evidence for the facilitative role of noticing comes from a study by Jourdenais, 
Ota, Stauffer, Boyson, and Doughty (1995). Participants were 14 native speakers of English 
enrolled in an introductory level Spanish foreign language program. These were randomly 
assigned to two treatment groups: Enhanced and Unenhanced. The Enhanced group was given a 
Spanish passage in which preterit verbs were shadowed and imperfect verbs were bolded. Both 
verb forms were underlined and printed in a different font. The Unenhanced group received the 
same passage without any typographical modifications. The post-test consisted of a task in which 
participants had to write a picture-based narrative while providing think-aloud protocols. Results 
showed that the Enhanced group used the target structure more often than the Unenhanced group 
on both the think-aloud protocols and the written production task, suggesting that input 
enhancement made the target forms more noticeable. Moreover, subsequent production by the 
Enhanced group was more target-like than the Unenhanced group, suggesting that noticing 
facilitated acquisition. 
Leow (2001) also used think-aloud protocols to examine how typographical input 
enhancement affects learners’ noticing of the formal imperative in Spanish. Participants were 38 
college-level students in a beginning level Spanish language program. The input consisted of a 
242-word reading passage that was typographically enhanced for one group and left unenhanced 
for the other. Participants were asked to provide think-aloud protocols as they read the passage. 
The pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest consisted of a multiple-choice recognition task and a 
cloze test. A short-answer task was used to measure comprehension of the reading passage. 
Results showed that 33% (7 out of 21) of the enhanced group mentioned the target forms in their 
protocols as compared with only 12% (2 out of 17) in the unenhanced group. No statistically 
significant differences were found between the two groups for: (a) amount of reported noticing 
of the targeted form, (b) comprehension, and (c) intake as measured by recognition. However, 
significant correlations were found in both groups between noticing and recognition. Leow 
points out that the effects of typographical enhancement may have been diminished by the length 
of the input. When faced with a long reading passage, learners might be using more global 
noticing strategies in order to process the large amounts of input. This would probably shift 
attention toward meaning and away from form, since the former is more important for 
comprehension. 
Leow’s explanation seems to be supported by VanPatten’s (1990) findings that attention 
to both form and meaning is difficult. However, the modality of the input in this case (written) 
differed from that in VanPatten’s study (aural). Could modality differentially affect attention to 
meaning and form? Wong (2001) tried to address this question with a partial replication of 
VanPatten (1990). His variations included the addition of a written mode of input and using 
English (instead of Spanish). Participants were 85 low intermediate EFL students at a French 
Canadian university. Findings for the aural input mirrored those of VanPatten, since there was a 
significant decrease in performance when participants had to attend to both content and form. 
However, no significant difference was found when the input was written (which incidentally 
took less time to read than the aural input). Moreover, when processing both form and meaning, 
the listening task proved more difficult than the written task, suggesting once again that different 
modalities may impose different attentional demands. 
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A more innovative experimental design by Leow (1997, 2000) provides further evidence 
for the facilitative role of awareness in SLA. Leow (1997) used a crossword puzzle task as input 
that was designed to initially induce learner error. Eventual clues in the puzzle provided learners 
with the correct form, thereby increasing their chances of noticing the mismatch. Participants 
were 28 adult beginners in a Spanish foreign language course. The target structures were the 
irregular third-person singular and plural preterit forms of stem-changing –ir verbs. Participants 
were asked to provide think-aloud protocols as they solved the crossword puzzle. The post-
exposure tasks consisted of a multiple-choice recognition and a written production task. Think-
aloud protocols were analyzed using Allport’s (1988) criteria for awareness, which divided 
participants into three groups: (1) unaware [+cognitive change, -meta-awareness, -metalinguistic 
description]; (2) low aware [+cognitive change, +meta-awareness, -metalinguistic description]; 
and high aware [+cognitive change, +meta-awareness, +metalinguistic description]. The study 
found that meta-awareness correlated with hypothesis testing and metalinguistic description. 
Moreover, the high aware group significantly outperformed the unaware and low aware groups 
on both post-exposure tasks.  
Similar results were found in a subsequent study (Leow, 2000). Its research design and 
target population (n=32) were similar to the 1997 study but included three new features: (a) 
Participants were asked to answer two probe questions assessing their awareness immediately 
following the input and again after the post exposure task; (b) Participants were instructed to 
continue the think-aloud protocols as they solved the post-exposure tasks; and (c) The unaware 
participants were interviewed after the experiment and asked to explain their answers on the 
recognition task. The fact that these interviews took place three weeks after the experiment raises 
the issue of memory effects. Nevertheless, these additional features seem to increase the internal 
validity of claims regarding the awareness of learners. Again, results showed that participants 
who displayed evidence of awareness performed better on the post-exposure tasks than those 
classified as unaware. 
In a similar experimental design, Rosa and O’Neill (1999) investigated the role of 
awareness in acquiring syntactic structures. Participants were 67 native English speakers enrolled 
in an intermediate Spanish course at an American university. These were randomly assigned to 
four groups based on the explicitness of instruction as follows: [-formal instruction, -directions to 
discover rules]; [+formal instruction, -directions to discover rules]; [-formal instruction, 
+directions to discover rules]; and [+formal instruction, +directions to discover rules]. The input 
consisted of a multiple-choice jigsaw puzzle that targeted counterfactual Spanish conditionals, 
which was followed by a multiple choice recognition task. Participants provided think-aloud 
protocols as they solved the puzzle to assess their level of awareness. Among other things, the 
study found that awareness seemed to increase learners’ ability to recognize the syntactic 
structures on the post-test. There was also a strong correlation between awareness and intake. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The review presented in this paper on attention and awareness in cognitive psychology 
and SLA is by no means exhaustive. Research in areas such as Corrective Feedback (Lightbown 
& Spada, 1990), Input Processing (VanPatten, 1996), and Interaction (Long, 1996), and Focus on 
Form (Long, 1996) clearly have important implications for the role of attention in SLA. Due to 
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limitations of space, the current review was confined to studies that included some measure of 
awareness, the key variable for testing Schmidt’s noticing hypothesis. 
The noticing hypothesis states that both attention and awareness are necessary for SLA. 
There appear to be several problems with this claim. One problem, alluded to earlier, relates to 
Schmidt’s definition of attention (Schmidt, 1994a). Truscott (1998) points out that the definition 
of attention as alertness, orientation, and detection makes the claim that attention is necessary for 
learning seem rather obvious. He argues that since learning cannot possibly take place without 
detection, the claim that learning requires attention (if attention = detection) has “no empirical 
content” (p. 106). We may therefore conclude that attention is by definition necessary for SLA. 
To avoid misinterpretations, future research should perhaps avoid descriptions such as 
unattended learning altogether. What researchers in cognitive psychology have reported as 
unattended learning is perhaps more accurately described as learning with low or residual 
attention. Schmidt (1995) himself points out that it is more important to demonstrate that 
learning is enhanced by attention rather than to demonstrate that learning cannot take place 
without it. Most of the findings presented in this review support the claim that increased attention 
leads to more learning (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; Curran & Keele, 1993; Eich, 1984; 
Kellogg, 1980) but this may depend on the nature of the task since increased attention did not 
always lead to better performance (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990). 
A second problem with the noticing hypothesis relates to evidence of implicit learning. A 
number of the studies reviewed in both cognitive psychology (Cohen et al., 1990; Curran & 
Keele, 1993; Hartman et al., 1989; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) and SLA (Alanen, 1995; 
Jourdenais et al. 1995; Leow, 1997, 2000, 2001; Rosa & O’Neill, 1999; Schmidt & Frota, 1986; 
VanPatten, 1990) suggest a facilitative role for awareness in learning and SLA. However, there 
does not seem to be sufficient evidence to suggest that awareness is necessary for learning. This 
seems especially true in cognitive studies that showed evidence of implicit learning. Schmidt’s 
(1995) contention that these studies did not demonstrate a complete absence of awareness seems 
justified in some cases (Hartman, et al., 1989) but not in others where participants were 
convincingly unaware (Cohen et al., 1990; Marcel, 1983; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). 
Tomlin and Villa (1994) also disagree with Schmidt on the necessity of awareness in 
learning. They argue for a dissociation between attention and awareness in learning, which 
brings them into conflict with the noticing hypothesis. However, according to Robinson (1995), 
“these different positions can be reconciled if the concept of noticing is defined to mean 
detection plus rehearsal in short-term memory, prior to encoding in long-term memory” (p. 296). 
This conception of noticing is based on the idea that a certain threshold must be exceeded before 
input in short-term memory becomes part of awareness. Thus it becomes possible to learn 
without awareness but such learning is believed to have limited effects. Schmidt’s recent 
writings have been more accepting of the possibility of limited learning without awareness, but 
he maintains that this type of learning is “of little potential benefit for language learning” (2001, 
p. 28). Yet, a moment’s reflection on how some children learn a second language through 
interaction with peers and without any explicit instruction may lead us to conclude that implicit 
learning is not only possible but also highly effective for acquiring an L2. Children in these 
contexts must surely pay attention to the L2 input, but they are unlikely to be preoccupied with 
noticing (as defined by Schmidt) the linguistic surface structure of the input, nor are they 
necessarily aware of the complex grammatical rules underlying their interlanguage. 
Despite its shortcomings, the noticing hypothesis has served to generate important 
theoretical and empirical debates in SLA. It has also provided an opportunity to integrate useful 
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concepts from cognitive psychology into SLA theory. But theories of attention/awareness in 
SLA have a long way to go in explaining what exactly gets noticed in the input (Truscott, 1998). 
Research is needed to determine what kind of interlanguage development results from noticing 
specific linguistic aspects. Do learners notice rules, exemplars, or both? Which stages of 
interlanguage devolvement are most appropriate for noticing specific structures? Any research 
design trying to answer these questions must include introspective data. Despite their 
subjectivity, introspective methods appear to be the only direct way of assessing what is noticed. 
Unfortunately, as Schmidt (1994a) points out, “the problem in applied linguistics has not been 
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Attention 
Awareness 
Understanding 
Noticing 
Detection
Orientation 
 Alertness 
